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et al.: Real Property--Rule of Caveat Emptor--Quasi-Contractual Liability
RECENT CASE COMMENTS
REAL PROPERTY .-

RULE OF Caveat Emptor -

QuAsI-CoN-

TRACTUAL LIABILITY OF VENDOR FOR FAILURE OF TITLE IN DEED

WITHOUT WARRANTIES. -

A purchaser of real estate under a con-

veyance without warranties sued the vendor to recover the purchase

money, after the title which had been obtained by the vendor under
a tax sale was declared void. The purchaser knew that she was
buying a tax title. Held, that "the vendor is not liable for failure
of title to real estate under a conveyance thereof without warranty
in the absence of fraud, mistake, or other equitable consideration."
Baker v. Letzkus. 1
If the syllabus is the law of the case, 2 the West Virginia court
has apparently extended the generally-accepted view of the rights
of a purchaser under a deed without warranties. A decided preponderance of American authorit' supports the proposition that
the instrument of conveyance determines the rights of the parties
in the absence of fraud alone, and for relief, the purchaser is
remitted to the rights he has secured under the covenants. 8 The
basis for this rule would seem to lie (1) in the unwillingness of
4
courts to remake the arrangement the parties made for themselves
and (2) the parol evidence rule.2 Typical statement of the rule
involves language to the effect that caveat emptor applies to real
property transactions, or that the purchaser has assumed the risk
by not requiring that covenants be included, the former being
designed to refute any argument in favor of an implied warranty,
the latter to defeat any suggestion of quasi-contractual right.
If it is believed that transfers of realty and personalty are
analogous, 6 and that the rule of caveat emptor works undue hard1182 S. E. 761 (W. Va. 1935). See, s. c., 113 W. Va. 533 (1933).
2 Hardman, A Problem in Interpretation (1936) 42 W. VA. L. Q. 110, at
120; Curtiss, The Syllabus is Not the Law of the Case (1931) 5 U. oF CN.
L. R v. 385.
3Listing v. Rodes, 96 W. Va. 38, 41, 122 S. E. 282 (1924); Johnston's
Adm'r v. Mendenhall, 9 W. Va. 112 (1876); Western Mining & Mfg. Co. v.
Peytona Cannel Coal Co., 8 W. Va. 406 (1875); Commonwealth v. McClanachan's Executors, 4 Rand. 482 (Va. 1826). Simonton, Observations on Covenants for Title (1928) 34 W. VA:. L. Q. 257; 2 TIwANY, REAL PROPERTY (2d
ed. 1920) § 430; 2 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS (1920) § 926.
4 For a forceful statement of this principle, see Commonwealth v. McClanachan's Executors, supra n. 3. But see MeClung v. McClung, 78 W. Va. 486,
89 S. E. 148 (1916); Kinports v. Rawson, 29 W. Va. 487 (1887); Wamsley
v. Stalnaker, 24 W. Va. 214 (1884), where a remedy beyond that provided
for in the covenant is allowed in equity by way of injunction against collection of purchase money.

5 WiGoRE, EvIDENCE (2d ed. 1923) § 2434.
6 Comment (1926) 15 CALIF. L. REv. 53, discusses the similarity between
real property transfers and transfers of personalty in relation to the question
of implied warranties, there being generally an implied warranty of title as
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ships on the purchaser, a change from the usual rule should be
made; but if so, it would seem that the change should be made
by statute since it would affect conveyancing, a field as to which
it is desirable that parties be able to ascertain the law in advance.7
Before the existence of a quasi-contractual obligation in this
type of situation may be determined, the "bargained for" exchange must be ascertained in order to see whether or not there
has been a failure of consideration. Thus, if the agreement was
to transfer merely what title the vendor actually had, there obviously has been no failure; but, as Williston says, if "it appears
that both parties entered into the transaction on the mistaken
assumption, not regarded as doubtful, that the vendor had title,
rescission is permitted ..... -8

STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS - INDORSER'S WARRANTY AS EXPRESS
oR ImPLIED PROMISE APPLICABILITY OF TEN-YEAR STATUTE TO
NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENT.

-

A bank indorsed the note of a Penn-

sylvania township to plaintiff "without recourse". Plaintiff sued
the township on the note, but was denied recovery on the ground
that the note was invalid, as having been improperly executed
according to the laws of Pennsylvania. Plaintiff then gave notice
of a motion for judgment in West Virginia against defendant,
receiver of the bank, based on the provision of the Negotiable Instruments Law that a person negotiating a note by a qualified
indorsement warrants "that the instrument is genuine and in all
respects what it purports to be." ' - Defendant demurred to the
notice, contending that this was an action on a contract not in
writing, and therefore barred by the five-year statute of limitations.2 Herd, that the ten-year statute of limitations was apto sales of personalty. Uniform Sales Act, § 13. Cogar v. Burns Lumber Co.,
46 W. Va. 256, 33 S. E. 219 (1899).
7If a statute were passed raising an implied warranty of title in cases of
transfer of realty, quaere as to the effect of knowledge of defects on the part
of the purchaser. In the case of personalty, knowledge will defeat the operation of warranties of title whether express or implied. WILLISTON, SALES
(2d ed. 1924) §§ 206, 207, 208. But as to realty, knowledge of a defect will
not defeat the effect of an express warranty of title. Bossieux v. Shapiro,
154 Va. 255, 153 S. E. 667 (1930).
8 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS

§ 926; see also § 1566.

VA. REv. CODE (1931) c. 46, art. 5, § 6.
c. 55, art. 2, § 6. "Every action to recover
money ....
shall be brought within the following number of years next after
the right to bring the same shall have accrued, that is to say ...
. if it be
3 W.

2W. VA. REV. CODE (1931)
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